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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1985 when the members of the European Community' (EC)
agreed to effectuate a complete internal market by the end of 1992 in
which goods, services, capital, and people could circulate unhampered by
national restrictions, the whole world has noted Europe's renewed eco-
nomic energy and its dedication to integration.2 Alternating between
panic over a "Fortress Europe" potentially closed to exports3 and eupho-
ria over expanded profit potential in a unified market of over 320 million
consumers,4 businesses and governments worldwide have begun postur-
ing for the challenges ahead.
It is crucial that political, economic, and legal actors understand the
subtleties of how the EC functions and what its aspirations are, in order
to avoid misunderstandings and missed opportunities. It is insufficient to
make facile comparisons between the EC and the United States under
either the Articles of Confederation or the present United States Consti-
tution; similar analogies to various historical European institutions miss
the point that the European Community emerges from a unique set of
circumstances and is thus developing a hybrid institutional and legal
framework to cope with the challenges of creating union where for so
many centuries disunion reigned.
II. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The idea of European unity is perhaps as old as Europe itself, but
ironically no single force impacted so greatly on aspirations for integra-
tion as the outcome of World War II. The war's destruction, Europe's
1. The European Community (EC) is variously referred to as the European Economic
Community (EEC), the European Communities (still its official name), and the Common
Market.
2. Comm'n of Eur. Comm., Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Com-
mission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final, at para. 4 (June 14, 1985) [hereinafter
White Paper].
3. Meessen, Europe en route to 1992: the completion of the internal market and its impact
on non-Europeans, 23 INT'L LAW. 359, 371 (1989).
4. See Jones, Putting "1992" in Perspective, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 463 (1989); see
also Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The Myth, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 480, 481 (1989).
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decline in importance relative to the emerging superpowers, and the
threat posed to Western Europe by the specter of Soviet-backed commu-
nism made Europeans dream of a united democratic Europe-strong,
prosperous, peaceable.5
A. Era of Establishment: The 1950s
Franco-German reconciliation was deemed a prerequisite for both
lasting peace and united action. In 1951 Belgium, France, West Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (the Six) signed the Paris
Treaty and created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).6
The ECSC marked a milestone because it brought Germany and France
together and because, for the first time, national governments ceded part
of their sovereignty, albeit on a limited basis, to a supranational
authority.
In March 1957, the Six signed the Treaties of Rome, which estab-
lished the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom) and the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC).7 The Paris and Rome Treaties
(Treaties) form the "constitution" of the EC. The immediate objective of
the EEC was the establishment of a customs union that would guarantee
free movement of goods, services, capital, and people (the Four Free-
doms) among Member States.8
B. Sporadic Progress: The 1960s
In July 1988 eighteen months ahead of schedule, the EEC imple-
mented the customs union and the common external tariff, but significant
difficulties in other areas hindered broader progress. Specifically,
although Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdomt applied
for EC membership in 1962, French President Charles de Gaulle's mis-
trust of British intentions delayed admission of these countries until
5. For further reading on the origins of European integration, see Borchardt, European
Uniflcation: The origins and growth of the European Community, 2 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTA-
TION 1 (1987); THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE (L. Tsoukalis ed.
1983).
6. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1988
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd. 455) 7 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty] (original version at 261
U.N.T.S. 140).
7. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd. 455) 255 [hereinafter EURATOM Treaty] (original version at 298
U.N.T.S. 259).
8. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 30 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987)
[hereinafter SEA]. The SEA takes the form of an international treaty and is an amendment to
and extension of the founding treaties.
1990]
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1973. 9
The EC budget created further crisis. In 1965 France rejected a
proposal to allocate the levies on imports charged at its external frontiers
to the EC. The impasse was only resolved by granting each member
country the right to veto any issue it considered of "vital interest."'
This was a major blow because it delayed the implementation of majority
voting that had been scheduled to take effect at that time.
C. Consolidation: The 1970s
Though the 1970s remained a time of external shocks and significant
stagnation, the EC made a number of advancements. Innovations in-
cluded the European Political Cooperation (EPC), founded in 1970,
whereby members agreed to consult before deciding on major foreign
policy issues,' 1 and the European monetary "snake" established in 1972
as a system for foreign exchange coordination within Europe. 2 Also, in
1979 the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held in
member countries.1 3
D. Expansion and Reaffirmation of Initial Goals: The 1980s
The 1981 admission of Greece' 4 and the admission of Portugal and
Spain in 198615 boosted the EC's population from 260 to 321 million
inhabitants.1 6 According to recent figures, the EC of Twelve accounts
for twenty-two percent of world trade. 7 This expansion along Europe's
southern flank has bolstred the EC's claim that it is the nucleus of a
future united Europe.
9. J. PAXTON, THE DEVELOPING COMMON MARKET: THE STRUCTURE OF THE E.E.C.
IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 12-13 (1976). In 1972 by referendum, however, Norway re-
jected EC membership. Id. at 19.
10. E. NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER-THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 25-26 (1988).
11. First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the
Member States of the European Community (Oct 27, 1970), [3 No. I1] BULL. EUR. COMM. 9
(1970). For a thorough analysis of the history, structure, and development of the EPC, see
Murphy, The System of European Political Cooperation: A Brief Explanation, 10 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 383 (1985).
12. For a detailed discussion of the "snake", see Works, The European Currency Unit:
The Increasing Significance of the European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41 Bus.
LAW. 483, 488-90 (1986).
13. E. NOEL, supra note 10, at 31.
14. The Community of Ten: Welcome to Greece, 17-18 EUROPEAN FILE 1 (1980).
15. A Community of Twelve: Welcome to Spain and Portugal, 17-18 EUROPEAN FILE 3
(1985).
16. Bangemann, supra note 4, at 481.
17. DELEGATION OF THE COMM'N OF THE EUR. COMM., PRESS & PUB. AFF. (1987).
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In 1985 the Council of Ministers adopted the White Paper, a de-
tailed plan for completing the internal market.1 8 It detailed roughly
three hundred actions that had to be agreed upon in order to realize the
internal market. The White Paper received broad support from the pub-
lic, the Member State governments, and the institutions of the EC. The
White Paper detailed the creation of a larger, more competitive market,
and thus persuaded national politicians to prioritize the goal of a unified
Europe.19
The implementation of the Single European Act (SEA)2" in July
1987 has had great institutional and legal significance. This Act pro-
vided the operational changes necessary to implement the White Paper
and laid the foundation for more ambitious and rapid progress toward
full union. The SEA extended qualified majority voting in four fields:
the internal market, research and development, economic and social co-
hesion, and improvement of working conditions. It also extended the
Treaties to cover monetary and environmental policy, increased the
Commission's and Parliament's powers of implementation and oversight,
and, for the first time, brought foreign policy cooperation officially under
the Treaties.
In the 1980s, the EC underwent tremendous revitalization. Eco-
nomic competition, a perception that the superpowers were too little con-
cerned with the interests of Europe, and United States pressure on
Europe to assume responsibility for its own defense have all led to a sig-
nificant rediscovery of the ideal of European union.
III. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
"The EC of today may be characterized as a customs union, with
additions reminiscent of a common market and an array of cooperative
activities that facilitate intercourse and strengthen the bonds among the
Member States."21 The EC exists, however, as a more dynamic and far-
reaching institution than this portrayal would admit.
18. White Paper, supra note 2.
19. Bangemann, supra note 4, at 481.
20. SEA, supra note 8.
21. Pelkmans, An Enterprising Community: The Common Market as Locomotive for Inte-
gration, [Winter] SCH. ADVANCED INT'L STUD. REV. 137 (1988).
1990]
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A. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
The CAP, established in 1962,22 stands as the EC's most prominent
and problematic accomplishment. The CAP was designed to avoid mas-
sive dislocation of farmers in the emerging common agricultural market.
It ensures uniform prices throughout the EC on most agricultural goods
and guarantees farm workers a standard of living comparable to that of
workers in other economic sectors.23 This has led to a system of prefer-
ences for EC-produced agricultural goods. At times "wine lakes"'24 and
"butter mountains"25 have vexed the EC because of CAP-sheltered over-
production. In 1987, for instance, CAP expenditures totaled 65.9 per-
cent of the EC budget.26
B. The Customs Union
Since 1968 the EC has been the world's largest nonnational customs
union in trade terms. Neither tariffs nor quotas have been imposed on
intra-EC trade and there is one common external tariff.2 7 Efforts to
achieve an internal market by 1992 center on the elimination of nontariff
barriers to intra-EC trade.2" The customs union has stimulated trade
among members. In 1958 trade among EC members was only 34.5 per-
cent of the total foreign trade of these same countries.29 In 1987 it had
risen to 58.7 percent. 30 The EC also maintains a common trade policy
and a coordinated, if not always uniform, foreign assistance program.31
The four Lom6 Conventions32 (1975, 1979, 1985, and 1989), concluded
with sixty-six African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, evidence
the cooperation in these fields.
C. The European Political Cooperation (EPC)
The EPC, sanctioned by the SEA in 1987, serves as the framework
22. Note, American Agricultural Exports and the E.E.C s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), 1982 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 133, 134 (1982).
23. 6 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION 24 (1982).
24. A Future for Europe's Wine, 12 EUROPEAN FILE (1980).
25. How the European Commission is tackling dairy surpluses, 4 EUROPEAN FILE (1980).
26. COMM'N OF EUR. COMM., THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY-
1987 REPORT 96 (1988).
27. Bangemann, supra note 4, at 481-82.
28. Id.
29. EUROSTAT: BASIC STATISTICS OF THE COMMUNITY 269 (26th ed. 1989) [hereinafter
EUROSTAT].
30. Id.
31. See Murphy, supra note 11.
32. For an analysis of the first two conventions, see Minta, The Lomd Convention and the
New International Economic Order, 27 How. L.J. 953 (1984).
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in which members coordinate their foreign policies and seek to develop a
joint EC foreign policy.33 Members must consult each other before de-
ciding major foreign policy matters.34 EC foreign ministers and ambas-
sadors worldwide increasingly formulate joint strategies, and in
international fora, the EC often speaks with one voice." The EC often
issues joint communiques on world events, but less frequently undertakes
joint action. Exceptions include the EC's swift support for the United
Kingdom in the Falklands War and the Community's development of a
code of conduct for EC firms to follow in South Africa.36
The ever closer links between foreign policy bureaucracies, which
the EPC mandates, have led to the rise of parallel foreign policy positions
between member countries. Still, some experts question whether a dra-
matic improvement, beyond the gradual overlap of national foreign poli-
cies, is possible given the loose framework of the EPC.37 However, the
EC's leadership in coordinating assistance to Hungary and Poland 31
showed that the EPC will continue to develop in matters where members
have largely coincident interests.
D. The European Monetary System (EMS)
Since 1979 when the EMS, with its exchange rate controls, replaced
the monetary "snake," there has been a degree of foreign exchange stabil-
ity in Western Europe never known before.39
The "snake" exchange rate arrangement set margins of fluctuation
for EC currencies vis a vis the United States dollar.' The margins main-
33. SEA, supra note 8, art. 30, at 13-14.
34. Id. art. 30(2)(a)-(d). These sections are debated in Murphy, European Political Cooper-
ation after the Single European Act; The Future of Foreign Affairs in the European Communi-
ties, B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 335, 348 (1989).
35. See, eg., Speech of Sir Geoffrey Howe, President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers,
at the Opening of the 41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 1986),
reprinted in PRESS & INFO. OFFICE, W. GER., EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION (EPCQ
(1988); Speech of Sir Geoffrey Howe, President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, at the
Opening of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna (Nov. 4, 1986), reprinted in PRESS & INFO.
OFFICE, supra.
36. For an assessment of both the code's importance as an expression of cooperative for-
eign policy making in the Community and its significant weaknesses as a tool for changing
policies in South Africa, see Holland, The EEC Code for South Africa: A reassessment, [41 No.
1] WORLD TODAY 12 (Jan. 1985).
37. Regelsberger, DIE EUROP.ISCHE POLITISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT [THE EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COOPERATION], EU-JAHRBUCH 88 (1988).
38. Riding, Aid to Poland and Hungary Pledged by Western Nations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1989, at A22, col. 1.
39. Works, supra note 12, at 484.
40. R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 537 n.179 (1985).
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tained for fluctuations of the United States dollar were wider than the
margins set for the EC currencies, in accordance with official Interna-
tional Monetary Fund policy.4' Thus, while the United States dollar
might fluctuate within a 4.5 percent range, the "snake" kept fluctuations
in EC currencies within a narrow 2.25 percent range.42
The stability resulting from the adoption of the EMS exchange rate
mechanism and the macroeconomic policy convergence that accompa-
nied it, facilitated the growth of larger EC-wide companies, fostered in-
tra-EC commerce, and furthered the internal market.43
There is much speculation about the development of an Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) with a central bank and a single currency.
In June 1988 the EC decided to remove all barriers to capital flows by
1992 and assembled a committee of central bank presidents, under the
leadership of Jacques Delors, to propose means of erecting-the EMU.'
However, serious obstacles remain. The United Kingdom's unwilling-
ness to support full monetary union as well as Franco-German rivalry
over control of monetary policy have traditionally been formidable limit-
ing factors.4 5
Despite these limitations, and over the U.K.'s direct objection, the
European Council, at its December 1989 Strasbourg summit, voted to
proceed with implementation of the EMU as recommended by the
Delors Committee. The first stage should be completed on July 1, 1990.
The European Council, noting that the necessary majority existed under
article 236 of the EEC Treaty, agreed to convene an Intergovernmental
Conference charged with amending the Treaties with a view toward
eventual implementation of the complete EMU by the end of 1990.46
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
Understanding the functioning of the EC is important in developing
and maintaining legal and business ties with Europe. Legal, economic,
and political questions once addressed to national capitals are now han-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Europe Without Frontiers: Towards a large internal market, 17 EUROPEAN FILE
(1987).
44. A European financial area: The liberalization of capital movements, 12 EUROPEAN
FILE 5-7 (1988).
45. Harris, Legal Implications of European Monetary Union, 139 NEW L.J. 1083, 1084
(1989).
46. 41 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEWS (WASHINGTON) 6 (Dec. 11, 1989).
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died by the EC in Brussels. The government of the EC has five principal
organs: the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Coun-
cil, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice.
A. The Commission: Initiator and Executive
The Commission is, in many ways, akin to the prime minister of a
parliamentary system, but it relies on the Council of Ministers to enact
its proposals. 47 The Commission consists of one or more representatives
from each Member State who are appointed to four-year terms by mu-
tual agreement of member governments.48 Commissioners, who are sub-
ject to parliamentary removal, must act in the interest of the EC and are
prohibited from receiving instructions from national governments.49
Nearly 15,000 officials in twenty directorates-general support the Com-
mission in its work. 0 Over ten percent of these employees are interpret-
ers and translators necessitated by the EC's nine official languages."1
The Commission has virtually the exclusive right of legislative initi-
ative. The Council may only create EC law, as opposed to treaty law,
when it acts on proposals of the Commission.52 The Commission re-
ceives guidelines and authority from the Council for the implementation
of specific acts that the latter has adopted. 3 The Commission, as execu-
tive, then has the responsibility to implement them. The Commission is
also responsible for guaranteeing compliance with the rules of the com-
mon market. It has the power to fine individuals and companies for
breaching EC competition rules. Such rulings may be appealed. The
Commission has the authority to prosecute violations of EC law. 4 Addi-
tionally, it is the Commission that negotiates trade and agricultural
agreements with third countries.5
47. The composition and powers of the Commission are governed by articles 155 to 163 of
the EEC Treaty as amended by the Accession Treaties and the Merger Treaty. Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd.
455) 82, 131-33 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (original version at 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
48. S. PAISLEY, A GUIDE TO E.E.C. LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 16 (1986).
49. Id.
50. The Directorates-General function very much like the executive branch agencies in
the United States federal government.
51. The European Commission and Administration of the Community. 3 EUROPEAN
DOCUMENTATION 22 (1989).
52. kd; e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 47, arts. 84(2), 136, 217, at 106, 126, 148 (dealing
with a sea and air transport policy for the EEC, association agreements with non-EEC coun-
tries, and the languages to be used by each institution).
53. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 18.
54. Id. at 17.
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 47, arts. 9(2), 10(2), 38, 39, 40, 43, at 86, 94-95.
1990]
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B. The Council of Ministers: Decision Maker
The Council consists of ministers from member governments, and
its presidency rotates every six months among them.5 6 The ministers'
titles vary with their duties: transportation ministers decide on liberaliz-
ing EC trucking, health ministers enact policies to combat AIDS, and
foreign ministers generally coordinate the politically sensitive work of
their ministerial colleagues. Decisions are made using a weighted voting
system "apparently based in part on population and in part on economic
strength"57 of member countries.
The Council can only act on Commission proposals and it can only
alter them by unanimity. 8 If the Council adopts a non-Commission pro-
posal, it becomes a binding intergovernmental agreement rather than EC
law. 9 These agreements, however, enjoy almost the same enforcement
by Community organs as EC law itself. Though the SEA extended quali-
fied majority voting to new areas, unanimity is still sought to the extent
practicable.6"
C. The European Council: Coordinator and Facilitator
The European Council is composed of heads of state who meet with
the President of the Commission. This body has met at least twice a year
since 1975; before then there were only informal summits of the heads of
government.61 The SEA sanctioned the European Council, but withheld
any lawmaking powers; these are reserved to the Council of Ministers.62
However, the decisions of the heads of government are routinely trans-
formed into EC law by their ministerial colleagues.63
D. The European Parliament: Directly Elected Advisor
Since 1979 the Parliament consists of MPs directly elected in mem-
56. The Council of Ministers is governed by articles 145 to 154 of the EEC Treaty as
amended by the Merger and Accession Treaties. Id. at 129-31. The Council combines the role
of the legislature of the EEC with that of its decision-maker. It is based in Brussels, right
beside the Commission building in the Rue de la Loi.
57. 4 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-A
COMMENTARY ON THE E.E.C. TREATY 5-118 (1988).
58. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 13-14.
59. For instance, the Council on December 16, 1980, acting without a proposal of the
Commission decided to expand the trade preferences granted to the former overseas territories
of member countries. Council Decision 80/1186/EEC, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 361) 1
(1980).
60. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 14.
61. See Lavwaars, The European Council, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 25 (1977).
62. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 29.
63. Id. at 13-15.
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ber countries. Prior to 1979 Euro-MPs had been selected by and from
the national parliaments." This change increased the Parliament's legiti-
macy, even in areas where its powers are severely limited. The Parlia-
ment currently consists of 518 members, elected for five years, who sit in
party rather than national groupings.65
Because the EC does not have a permanent capital, the Parliament's
work is divided between three cities-plenary sessions in Strasbourg, staff
headquarters in Luxembourg, and specialized committee meetings in
Brussels.66 Notwithstanding recent efforts by the Parliament to concen-
trate more of its activity in Brusels, the travails of the Parliament still
appear as an extended game of musical chairs.
The Parliament lacks the law-making authority of a national legisla-
tive body. Rather, it oversees the legislative processes of the Commission
and Council.67 It must also give its opinion on Commission proposals
before they are acted on by the Council.68 The Commission often revises
its work to reflect parliamentary concerns. The SEA established a new
"cooperation procedure" whereby Parliament can amend Commission
and Council proposals in four areas: the internal market, improvement of
working conditions, technology and research, and regional policy.69 In
these areas, amendments may be overridden only by unanimity in the
Council.7 °
The Parliament can also dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds
majority, although it has never done so. 71 It must approve the EC
budget, and through its unwillingness to do so, may influence overall
spending priorities.72 The SEA gave Parliament the power to veto trea-
ties with third countries, 73 and it must also consent to the admission of
new members. 74
64. Articles 137 to 144 of the EEC Treaty as amended by the Merger Treaty and the
Treaty of Accession govern the "European Parliament." EEC Treaty, supra note 47, at 127-28.
65. Since the European Parliamentary elections in June 1989, the membership of 518 has
been grouped as follows: Socialist 181, European People's Party 123, Communist 41, Rainbow
Group 39, Independents 15, European Democratic Alliance 19, Liberal 44, European Demo-
crats 34, and European Rights 22. Binyon, Labour Surge Helps the Left Take Control, London
Times, June 20, 1989, § 1, at 10, col. 5.
66. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 21.
67. E. NOEL, supra note 10, at 33.
68. Id at 35.
69. Ide at 35-36.
70. Id. at 36.
71. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 24.
72. d at 23-24.
73. SEA, supra note 8, art. 9, at 6.
74. d art. 8.
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E. The Court of Justice: Community Arbiter
The Court, with its seat in Luxembourg, is comprised of thirteen
judges and six advocates-general.75 The Justices are appointed by con-
sent of the members, but must be independent and impartial.76 Upon
request of an EC organ, a government, or an individual citizen, the Court
may nullify any measure adopted by the Commission, the Council, or a
national government which is incompatible with EC law.77 This is a far-
ranging mandate that invites the Court to be active in the development of
a comprehensive body of EC laws and decisions.
When court action in a member country leads to a disputed point of
EC law, a national court may apply to the Court of Justice for a ruling
on the applicability of EC law.7" Judgments of the Court overrule those
of national courts and thus create a unique supranational legal regime.79
On the invitation of the Commission, the Court may also give binding
opinions on agreements that the EC proposes to enter with third
countries. s°
The Court is increasingly active in the development of the EC and
its legal system. For example, the Court affirmed the direct applicability
of such EC treaty-imposed principles, as equal pay for men and women
and the right of professionals to practice throughout the Community."1
V. TOWARDS 1992 AND BEYOND
A. Origins and Goals of the White Paper and the Push for 1992
The White Paper's goal 2 is to allow residents and goods in the post-
1992 EC to travel as freely from Berlin to Barcelona as they do from
Hartford to Honolulu. Fiscal, technical, physical, and social barriers to
trade among members must be eliminated.
Support for the White Paper emerged across Europe for three prin-
cipal reasons: changes in the international political economy made ac-
tion appear imperative; 3 a permissive domestic political climate was in
75. EEC Treaty, supra note 47, arts. 17, 18, at 88.
76. Id. art. 167, at 134.
77. S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 28.
78. Id. at 27-28.
79. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION
15-16 (1980).
80. EEC Treaty, supra note 47, art. 228(1), at 151.
81. See Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419 (The Court claimed
jurisdiction to protect fundamental human rights.).
82. White Paper, supra note 2.
83. Bangemann, supra note 4, at 480-82.
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evidence in leading EC countries; and instability in East-West relations
gave European leaders renewed cause to cooperate in economic as well as
political matters.8 4 The Commission and the Council, however, have
brought into their deliberations a myriad of ancillary initiatives designed
to integrate members more broadly.
By 1985 the "go-it-alone" strategies adopted in Europe to cope with
both the oil price shocks and increased competition from Japan and the
NICs, had been largely discredited. 5 In 1987 EC unemployment aver-
aged 10.6 percent, 6 and between 1980 and 1987 consumer prices in the
Community jumped 68.4 percent, 7 and between 1982 and 1987 annual
growth in Community GDP averaged only 2.3 percent.88 These figures
compared with 6.1 percent 9 and 41 percent,90 and 4.3 percent, 91 respec-
tively, for the United States. Europeans were quick to ascribe the dispar-
ity in economic progress to American efforts at deregulation. As one
observer noted, "[i]ncontestably, the vision of a great European internal
market grew out of admiration for the American version."92
These economic imperatives, coupled with a new political climate in
principal EC countries, provided fertile ground in which to resow the
seeds of integration. Historically, the United Kingdom has been more
skeptical of integration than the other Member States. Nevertheless,
Prime Minister Thatcher sought to prevent the United Kingdom from
becoming an "outcast at the outskirts" of Europe. The goals of 1992, in
their narrowest sense essentially an experiment in market deregulation,
fit in nicely with the British Conservative Party's economic goals.
French President Mitterand, after failed attempts at socialist reflation in
1981 and 1982, was more than ready to embark on cooperative economic
management. Renewed integration, he hoped, would offer France a
greater leadership role in Europe. West German Chancellor Kohl, who
came to power on promises of market liberalization, was also anxious to
embrace European proposals parallel to his own. Kohl, like Mitterand,
desired the increased clout a more unified Europe might bring Germany.
The heightened Cold War rhetoric of the early 1980s, and the per-
84. See A. BLINKEN, ALLY VERSUS ALLY; AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE SIBERIAN PIPE-
LINE CRISIS (1987).
85. Bangemann, supra note 4, at 480-82.
86. EUROSTAT, supra note 29, at 126.
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 126.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id. at 41.
92. A Survey of Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988, at 41.
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ception by many West Europeans that Europe was akin to a pawn in a
complex geostrategic game between reckless superpowers, did much to
strengthen their conviction that they must assert greater influence over
events on their own continent.93 The 1986 Reykjavik Summit, in which
the Soviet Union and United States seemed close to agreement on issues
vital to Europe, only underscored the need for Europe to speak with one
voice.
B. Obstacles to, and Forces in Favor of the Internal Market
Observers hailed the White Paper as a masterful effort to move the
EC toward a united market that embraced 320 million consumers. By
focusing on practical ends rather than political means, the White Paper
left undone the task of defining the most politically acceptable ways of
achieving these goals. It also gave European politicians a finite checklist
of concrete goals for which to aim.
Both the "Euro-euphoria" currently in evidence in Europe and the
isolated nationalist backlash obfuscate the extent to which there has al-
ready been achievement, and the obstacles that lie ahead. Already great
progress has been charted. By June 1989 the Commission, Council, and
Parliament had fully passed 134 of the 279 necessary measures toward
1992. 94 An additional ninety-seven proposals were awaiting final ap-
proval of Parliament.95 This means that the EC organs have roughly
three years in which to enact the remaining half of the necessary meas-
ures. While many of these directives have direct effect, others must be
translated into law by the national legislative bodies.96 This latter pro-
cess has been exceedingly slow in some member countries, but the Court
can partially remedy such failings by ruling against Member States who
fail to have laws on the books by January 1, 1993. 9' The Council has not
acted solely on the politically expedient proposals, leaving to the end
those likely to halt or reverse integration. For example, while it has not
yet finally acted on the harmonization of the national value added taxes
(VATs), a necessary prerequisite to dismantling border checks and one of
the most contentious issues, it has already adopted directives that will
eliminate all impediments to capital flows within the EC.98 The latter
93. A. BLINKEN, supra note 84.
94. Financial Times (London), June 12, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
95. Id.
96. See S. PAISLEY, supra note 48, at 13, 18.
97. The Court of Justice of the European Communities, supra note 79, at 12.
98. A European financial area: The liberalization of capital movements, supra note 44, at 5-
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had been viewed by experts as one of the most vital yet difficult issues to
tackle.99
The obstacles to full and timely achievement of the goals of the
White Paper are still formidable. Important groups oppose integration.
Among these are medium-sized industries which have been sheltered by
nontariff barriers, 1" some trade unions in wealthier member countries
that fear the loss of jobs to poorer regions,101 and a variety of nationalist
elements in various Member States.
According to prevailing European views, eliminating internal border
checks will require the harmonization of immigration and asylum poli-
cies, a uniform gun control law, harmonization of VAT rates, and copi-
ous other harmonizations 0 2 (far more, in fact, than exist between the
American states). For example, for border checks to fall Denmark
would have to cancel its longstanding passport union with non-EC Nor-
dic countries. Radical and violent groups such as the Irish Republican
Army, Basque separatists, and the Red Army Faction also give EC mem-
bers pause about eliminating all internal border inspections. In an effort
to prepare for the elimination of border checks, the Benelux countries,
France, and West Germany agreed on October 30, 1989, to allow their
police to pursue and arrest criminals across their common borders.
While the obstacles remain formidable, there exists a broad coalition
of powerful elements that favor the White Paper goals. The coalition is
comprised of highly competitive major industries, some trade unions,
most financial service institutions, economists, free-market politicians,
and pro-European intellectuals. Business is pushing both the Council
and Commission hard to maintain their prescribed deadline.10 3
Moreover, EC members have used education campaigns to
strengthen support for 1992. They hope these will provide momentum to
the White Paper project. With few exceptions, the governments that
staked their political futures on economic integration have just faced or
will face reelection between now and 1992. Barring a major economic
99. Id. at 1.
100. The Community and Business: The action programme for small and medium-sized
enterprises, 3 EUROPEAN FILE 5 (1988).
101. Greenhouse, Workers Want Protection from the Promises of 1992, N.Y. Times, June
25, 1989, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
102. See, e.g., The removal of technique barriers to trade, 18 EUROPEAN FILE (1988); The
European Community's Transport Policy, 1 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION (1984); Europe
without frontiers: Completing the internal market, 2 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION (1989).
103. Speech of Karl-Heinz Naijes, The EC Integrated Market by 1992-Obstacles, Benefits,
and International Consequences, at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Washington (July 13,
1988).
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downturn, they will find it difficult to renege on their promises of a more
united and prosperous Europe.
The directives liberalizing capital flows in the EC may help support
efforts at closer union. Once these directives are fully in effect, European
banks will be far less regulated than their United States counterparts and
thus, will enjoy unrestricted access to 320 million potential clients.1"
This development could release economic forces that will pull the Twelve
closer together by compelling harmonization of economic policies and
perhaps requiring a European central bank.105
Finally, there are concrete economic reasons for believing the push
toward economic and political union will continue. Economic competi-
tion from Japan and the NICs will likely persist. One very respected
report recently highlighted the economic gains attendant the completion
of the internal market; 1992 will likely boost EC GDP by at least five
percent, reduce prices by six percent, and create two million jobs." 6 The
savings could total 170 to 250 billion ECUs for the twelve member states
at 1988 prices.1 7 With business leaders taking these predictions as fact
there is great pressure on politicians to deliver on their promises.
Setbacks will accompany progress, but business interests and Euro-
pean-minded politicians now represent the driving force behind 1992.
The most likely obstacle to rapid progress may be the nationalist back-
lash that could materialize in some countries, or the instability generated
by the decay of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. 108 The recent pro-
gress of the far right in some state and local elections in West Germany,
most notably the Republicans, 109 is a troubling example of potential ob-
stacles to integration.'1 As the European "noose" gets tighter, politi-
104. .4 European financial area: The liberalization of capital movements, supra note 44, at 5-
7.
105. Greenhouse, Europeans Adopt Plan to End Curbs on Capital Flows, N.Y. Times, June
14, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
106. Address of Lord Cockfield to the Institute of International Economics, Washington
11 (May 24, 1988).
107. Cecchini, Study Analyzes Impact of 1992 Internal Market, 276 EUROPE 18 (May
1988).
108. See, e.g., Cowell, Officers Say Party in Rumania Plans To Dissolve Itself, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 1990, at A1, col. 6; Yugoslavia Plans to Ease Party Grip, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at
A9, col. 1; Haberman, Bulgaria's Communist Chief Plans To Relax Grip and Hold Elections,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Kamm, New Czech Cabinet Puts Communists in
Minority Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989, at Al, col 6; Schmemann, In East Europe, Reform
Isn't Good Enough, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
109. The Republicans (Republikaner) had as their campaign slogan for the June 1989 Eu-
ropean Parliamentary elections: "Germany First, Then Europe." Even as first time contend-
ers, in some areas of West Germany they received as much as 15% of the popular vote.
110. However, changes in Eastern Europe may have weakened the far right. The Republi-
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cians may be tempted to go it alone and reassert their national
sovereignty.
C. Beyond 1992: The Dynamics of Self-Sustained Integration
EC leaders have begun laying the groundwork for self-sustained in-
tegration after 1992. They have initiated a range of programs to develop
a "People's Europe" in which the benefits of increased union are tangible
to all citizens.111 Efforts to develop an EC identity and to increase cross-
border contacts are central to this plan.
D. Nurturing a European Identity
At the symbolic level, the EC adopted a Community flag" 2 (twelve
gold stars in a circle on a blue background), an anthem113 (the Ode to
Joy from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony), and replaced national passports
with standardized EC passports.1 14 Looking to the successor genera-
tions, school textbooks are being rewritten to put more emphasis on the
EC and to highlight the commonalities among the member cultures.
1 15
A single European communications market is being established in which
all broadcasters will be guaranteed equal access to national markets.116
As France's European Affairs Minister recently asked, "What would re-
main of our cultural identity if audiovisual Europe consisted of European
consumers sitting in front of Japanese television sets showing American
programs?"117 The elimination of border checks is the cornerstone of the
"People's Europe," but this achievement may have to wait until some-
time after 1992.
E. Bringing Europeans Together
The Commission and Council assume that as contacts between citi-
zens increase, so too will pressure on members to break down barriers to
free cultural and social exchange. Education exchanges have been initi-
ated to bring future elites together. The Comett program (Programme of
cans received less than the 5% needed to qualify for proportional representation in the Ger-
man state of Saarland in January 1990.
111. For a more detailed description of the People's Europe, see FACT SHEETS ON THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE AcTivmEs OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, at En III/
V (1987).
112. Towards a People's Europe, 3 EUROPEAN FILE 10 (1986).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Young People in the European Community, 3 EUROPEAN FILE 10 (1984).
116. See Towards a large European audio-visual market, 4 EUROPEAN FILE 4 (1988).
117. Johnson, In Search of... the European T. V Show, 291 EUROPE 22 (Nov. 1989).
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the Community in Education and Training for Technology) 1 ' initiated
in 1987, fosters cooperation between universities and industry at the Eu-
ropean level. In its first year it financed 108 university-industry training
partnerships and 1,067 transnational placements of students in indus-
try.11 9 The Erasmus program (European Community Action Scheme for
the Mobility of University Students) encourages and assists students to
complete a portion of their studies in another EC country. 120
The Community has also adopted directives that will make a variety
of professional diplomas universally accepted in the EC. 121 These meas-
ures, along with recent extensions of the right of professionals to live and
practice anywhere in the EC, will greatly increase the mobility of citi-
zens. Additionally, since 1981 in Ireland and Denmark, and since 1983
in the Netherlands, all EC citizens have had the right to vote in local
elections. 122 The Council currently has a measure before it that would
enact such a provision EC-wide.123 The development of voting rights for
EC residents living outside their country of origin would greatly change
the political dynamics of European integration.
In recent years, other forms of intra-EC contact have blossomed. In
1985 for instance, almost two-thirds of all holidays taken by EC residents
outside their own country were taken in other EC states. 124 In the long
run such widespread contacts will foster European identity. Perhaps of
more immediate significance, however, is the surge in intra-EC corporate
mergers. In 1984 before the adoption of the White Paper, there were
only about sixty cross-border corporate mergers. That figure rose to
roughly 160 such mergers in 1987.125 Such developments spurred labor
unions, consumer groups, and other lobbyists to form EC-wide umbrella
organizations to lobby in Brussels. This variety of transnational contacts
will Europeanize political actors in the Community and their political
programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The European Community is not just a common market but rather a
nascent political union. 1992 should be viewed as an expression of
118. For young people: Comett, Erasmus, "YES for Europe", 7 EUROPEAN FILE 4 (1988).
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications, 13 EUROPEAN FILE 7-10
(1984).
122. Europeans: 4 universal right to vote in local elections, 19 EUROPEAN FILE 3 (1988).
123. Id. at 1.
124. COMM'N OF EUR. COMM., EUROPEANS AND THEIR HOLIDAYS 29 (1987).
125. A Survey of Europe's Internal Market, supra note 92, at 38.
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profound political resolve to meet the imperatives of the present age head
on. Unless the underlying conditions in the global marketplace funda-
mentally change, Europeans will continue to see the need to act jointly in
the economic and, to an increasing degree, the political spheres; the EC
will remain at the heart of the varied pan-European initiatives that are
likely to proliferate in the years ahead.126
Observers believe the prospects for 1992 are promising. The White
Paper program is already opening up the European marketplace and con-
tributing to the development of a European identity. Strong support for
the EC exists among the peoples of Europe. In 1988 sixty-nine percent of
EC residents polled said that the EC was a good thing. 127 Support was
highest in Italy (eighty-five percent) and lowest in Great Britain and
Denmark (fifty percent).12 The winds of change and renewal which
have swept the countries of Eastern Europe in the past year have given
statesmen in the West pause to consider the effects these changes may
ultimately have on European integration. Soviet leader Gorbachev has
repeatedly proposed the eventual formation of "One European House"
under whose roof the European countries of East and West would live in
some kind of peaceful cooperation.1 29 While it is clear that newly un-
leashed market forces may ultimately lead to a number of new applica-
tions for admission to the EC, it is the German Question which is most
troubling to European observers.130
The opening of the Berlin Wall may have the greates longterm im-
pact on European integration. The delicate balance of power nurtured
over the years within the EC may become distorted, and may in turn
seriously strain the working relationship between Bonn and Paris. Ger-
man reunification1 3 may either tend to split the countries of Western
Europe apart or propel them together at an increased rate.132
126. For example, the EC has taken a leading role in coordinating aid to Eastern Europe.
See Lending a Helping Hand, 295 EUROPE 21 (Mar. 1990).
127. Eurobarometer Public Opinion and Europe, 9 EUROPEAN FILE 7 (1989).
128. Id.
129. Markham, Gorbachev's Vision, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
130. East Germany's leader dropped political neutrality as a pre-condition of German uni-
fication. Tuohy, East Germans Talk of a United Country that Isn't Neutral, San Francisco
Chronicle, Feb. 5, 1990, at A19, col. 5.
131. German reunification is the subject of the "Two Plus Four" negotiation agreed to at
the March 1990 Open Skies Summit in Ottawa, Canada and will be further discussed at the
Fall 1990 meeting of the members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE).
132. East Germany's first free elections were held on March 18, 1990. The Conservative
Alliance for Germany, a three-party coalition, won by a landslide of 48.14 percent of the vote.
(The Center-left Social Democrats got 21.84 percent of the vote, while the Communist Party
got 16.3 percent.) The Conservative victory is expected to quicken the pace toward German
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In the immediate future, the West German bureaucracy will be dis-
tracted by the myriad tasks attendant monetary and political union with
the territory of East Germany. For the foreseeable future its financial
resources will be significantly diverted to the reconstruction of the east-
ern half of a united Germany. In fact, if EC development funds flow to
the underdeveloped regions of a united Germany, Germany may for the
first time become a net financial recipient within the Community.
In the interim period before reunification, East Germany will con-
tinue to enjoy virtual membership in the EC's customs union. Pursuant
to a protocol note to the Rome Treaties, under EC law goods produced
in East Germany must be allowed the same free circulation in the Com-
munity as goods produced in West Germany. In the unlikely event that
reunification were a protracted matter, West German firms would now
relocate to East Germany, in order to circumvent the minimum wage
and social benefits which may be enacted under the European Social
Charter. Such an occurrence would seriously undermine the quid pro
quo which enticed Southern European countries like Greece, Portugal,
and Spain to join the Community.
On the other hand it is very likely that fears of "West German drift"
will finally give countries like Denmark and Great Britain the needed
impetus to become champions of fuller union. The EC itself grew in part
out of a realization that European peace and prosperity were predicated
on reconciliation with Germany. West German business itself appears to
fear a possible pull to the East and is determined to keep Bonn on target
with European integration.
Progress in European integration can be halted but the dynamics of
the process, especially after the White Paper, will make it very difficult to
reverse. This will especially remain the case if the European Community
continues to face increased competition in world markets, and if a modi-
cum of stability is maintained on both sides of the European divide in the
years ahead.
reunification. East German Right-Wing Win Sets Off West German Market Rally, Reuters,
Mar. 19, 1990.
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